как перевести?

[Volk-Vovan]

Under moral huzard, the economic intuition is that only the limited liability constraint in case of failure may be binding

[V]

hAzard?

context?
:-)

[Volk-Vovan]

To simplify the resolution of this kind of model, the modeler usually
rst guesses the way the limited liability constraint is binding and
checks ex post that this constraint is indeed stricly satis ed. Under
moral hazard, the economic intuition is that only the limited liability
constraint in case of failure may be binding. Under adverse selection,
the modeler guesses that only the limited liability constraint associated
with the least e cient agent may be binding. The purpose of this
research is to investigate how the modeler selects a limited liability
constraint on utility within a generalized principal-agent problem. A
generalized principal-agent problem arises when the principal's payo
function depends on both the private information and the unobservable
action of the agent ( see. Myerson

[alex.k]

При моральной опасности экономическая интуиция подсказывает, что связывающим может быть только условие ограниченной ответственности в случае неудачи.